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The student of contemporary Mexico confronts an array of baffling 
paradoxes. These paradoxes serve to both confuse and enlighten politi-
cal analysts who attempt to penetrate and discern the substance of Mexi-
can politics. There has been, for example, impressive economic growth 
in Mexico coupled with a sizable marginal population which has not 
enjoyed the benefits of this growth and in some instances, the material 
well-being of this marginal population has actually declined. 1 In 
Mexico, political participation decreases with competition, whereas in 
the West, political participation tends to increase with competitive-
ness. 2 Those groups of Mexican society which are most supportive of the 
regime are the same segments of Mexican society which are the most disad-
vantaged by the existing arrangement. Mexico is, in many respects, an 
authoritarian regime whose existence is dependent upon popular support. 
It is within this context that the Mexican political system must be 
viewed. Also within this context rests the future viability of the 
Mexican system. 
As Kenneth Coleman suggests, much has been written about one-party 
systems, but little theory exists concerning regime maintenance through 
the identification of potential destabilizing problems. 3 The purpose of 
this study is two-fold. First, the essential and distinctive features of 
the Mexican political system will be evaluated. The foundation upon 
which the Mexican one-party system rests will be analyzed in an effort to 
1 
assess its strengths along with its weaknesses. Secondly, this study 
will attempt to identify the major problem areas which are likely to 
threaten continued stability in Mexico. Hopefully, this study will 
provide insights into the dynamics of one-party authoritarian regimes 
and their ability to adapt to various problematic situations. 
2 
Mexico offers a fertile field of inquiry on several counts. First, 
Mexico's authoritarian regime is generally considered to be one of the 
more stable established one-party systems. Secondly, the regime will 
experience substantial strain due to enormous population growth and ab-
ject poverty resulting from gross income inequality and high unemploy-
ment. The hypothesis of this study is that the stability of the Mexican 
political system is connected to the effectiveness of the system's per-
formance in responding to destabilizing elements within the system. 
Consequently, unless effective measures are adopted to satisfy popular 
demands, social conflict and political violence will increase which will 
threaten the continued stability of the regime. It is readily admitted 
that this type of study lacks the scientific or empirical preciseness 
which can be found in much of the social science literature. But it is 
also asserted that our lack of understanding of the vulnerability of 
some regimes to revolution or coup d'etat justifies a work of this 
nature. While the scope of this study must be limited to Mexico, the 
issue of regime maintenance is not. 
Mexico is a nation well advanced in the process of modernization 
and also political development as measured by the level of institution-
alization of political organizations and procedures. But as Samuel P. 
Huntington suggests, "As a concept fiolitical developmen..£7, it does not 
suggest that movement is likely to be in only one direction; institu-
3 
tions, we know, decay and dissolve as well as grow and mature. 11 4 Later 
in reference to the absence of literature on the process of decay in 
political institutions, Huntington notes: 
As a result, models and concepts which are hopefully en-
titled "developing" or "modernizing" are often only par-
tially relevant to the countries to which they are applied. 
More relevant in many cases would be models of corrupt or 
degenerating societies, highlighting the decay of political 
organizations and the increasing dominance of disruptive 
forces.5 
Thus, within Huntington's theoretical framework, Mexico is offered as 
an example of a society experiencing political decay or degeneration. 
This assertion does not imply that the process is irreversible or that 
political collapse is inevitable. To be more precise, this study is 
seeking to delimit the range within which the Mexican regime is capable 
of response; and to ascertain whether the problems confronting contem-
porary Mexico are within the scope of remedial power. 
The prediction of political events is precarious at best. There-
fore, this study does not seek to forecast Mexico's future development. 
But instead, this study attempts to identify destabilizing forces pre-
sently undermining Mexico's political system. What the analyst cannot 
foresee is the critical point at which a potential destabilizer becomes 
an actual destabilizer. Nor can the analyst predict what event or per-
son may emerge as the necessary catalyst. What is asserted, however, is 
that the next decade or two may well prove to be crucial ones in terms 
of the future of the Mexican polity. Harold Laski once observed that 
the values upon which political institutions are based are born of the 
ability to satisfy mass-demands, they wither away as that ability di-
minishes.6 Clearly, the increasing violence and alienation facing Mexi-
co are the outgrowth of unsatisfied mass-demands. 
4 
Essentially, this study asserts that the increasing violence and 
alienation afflicting Mexico are warning signals that the system is 
experiencing a loss of legitimacy. Political legitimacy is paramount to 
the survival of any political order. A political system based solely 
upon coercion is neither stable nor likely to long endure. Legitimacy, 
as a concept, is a subjective evaluation by citizens of their political 
system. An individual's assessment of his political system~whether he 
considers it to be legitimate or illegitimate--is derived from a two-
dimensional appraisal.7 That is, the sources of political legitimacy 
are two-fold. One source is instrumental and is concerned with effec-
tiveness and performance. Loyalty to the political system is secured if 
the individual perceives the system as responsive to the mass-demands 
of the citizenry. 
Secondly, loyalty to a political system is also created through a 
sentimental attachment. Sentimental attachment occurs when an individual 
holds an emotional commitment to the system. Cultural identity, nation-
alism, and a sense of community are channels through which a sentimental 
attachment to the system can be built. It is possible, however, that an 
individual's cultural or national identity may not be transferred into 
an attachment for political institutions. (For example, a Frenchman 
could value his identity of being French, but at the same time consider 
French political institutions as illegitimate.) This may well be the 
case in Mexico which illustrates the importance of the symbolism of the 
Mexican Revolution in building legitimacy for the system. 
Sentimental and instrumental attachment to a political system are 
independent processes, but also they are not mutually exclusive pheno-
mena. 8 Therefore it is reasonable to conclude that a system which can-
5 
not meet the needs of its people will ultimately experience a loss of 
sentimental attachment. Conversely, a system which suffers from a lack 
of sentimental attachment by its population loses some capacity to be 
effective. In short, the loss of political legitimacy consists of the 
interaction of these two processes. 
Admittedly, detecting the loss of legitimacy of a political system 
poses an analytical problem. Basically, the problem centers on the 
selection of viable criteria for making such an assessment. Primarily, 
this study is concerned with the lack of effectiveness of the political 
system as an indicator of loss of legitimacy. S.M. Lipset has asserted 
that the legitimacy of a political system is closely associated with the 
manner in which the basic cleavages of society have been resolved.9 
According to Lipset, three major issues have tended to divide society 
in Western nations: first, the role of the church in society; second, 
political participation by the masses; third, the distribution of in-
come.10 Mexico's attempt to resolve these cleavages, especially the 
latter two, is far from successful and in fact this paper will argue 
that the cleavages in Mexican society are widening rather than narrowing. 
Secondly, the decay of Mexican political institutions is affirmed 
by increasing alienation of the population vis-a-vis the political sys-
tem. Alienation is manifested in two types of political behavior. 
First, alienation is evidenced by a withdrawal of support through de-
creasing political participation. For example, the last decade has wit-
nessed a significant decline in voter turnout. 11 Thus active 
participation is replaced by non-participation. Secondly, alienation 
from the system is found in increased overt anti-system behavior. Poli-
tical violence such as kidnapping, riots, and demonstrations serve to 
challenge the physical maintenance of the regime by substituting con-
frontation for system allegiance. 
6 
The approach of the study is of a descriptive and analytical nature. 
Since this study also seeks an overall perspective, some of the parts 
which constitute the intellectual whole are unavoidably compromised. 
But one does well to remember Barry Commoner's "First Law of Ecology," 
the acknowledgement that "Everything is Connected to Everything Else." 
This maxim is as applicable to political systems as it is to ecosystems. 
While this study adopted a comprehensive approach, it nevertheless is 
not exhaustive. The dynamics of the Mexican system include many vari-
ables working simultaneously to undermine and reinforce the present 
regime which are not noted here. 
Chapter II will outline the structure and features of the Mexican 
political system. Also included is a discussion of the Mexican Revolu-
tion of 1910 and its impact on the development of the current regime. 
The next two chapters focus on perhaps the most pressing problems which 
are currently confronting the Mexican regime. Chapter III will note the 
persistence of extreme income inequality despite rapid aggregate eco-
nomic growth. Chapter IV details the Mexican population explosion and 
the strain it places on available resources. Additionally, the massive 
emigration of millions of Mexicans to the United States as a result of 
insufficient opportunities is discussed. Finally, Chapter V will attempt 
to reach a judgment concerning the structural responsiveness of the 
system in view of the nature of the problems beseiging the Mexican 
regime. 
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CHAPTER II 
MEXICO'S POLITICAL SYSTEM 
Requisite to understanding Mexico's present is to understand her 
past. Customarily, this requires an examination of the Mexican Revo-
lution of 1910. The Mexican Revolution provided the Constitution of 
1917 and also still provides the basis of legitimacy for the present 
regime. The Revolution was notable on several other counts as well. 
Lasting over ten years, the conflict was one of the most violent and 
costly revolutionary struggles ever. A full ten percent of the Mexican 
nation perished as a result of the Revolution. 1 Secondly, the Revolu-
tion destroyed the feudal structures that had prevented the development 
of Mexico into a modern state. 
However, the conventional wisdom regarding the significance and 
effect of the Mexican Revolution is undergoing a reassessment. 2 The 
orthodox view of the events of 1910-1920 maintains that the Revolution 
was a social and political upheaval which destroyed the existing poli-
tical institutions and in their wake a new political order was estab-
lished. Challenging this view, Lorenzo Meyer contends that "the changes 
were less significant than the continuities. The Mexican Revolution did 
not destroy the authoritarian nature of Mexican political life, it mod-
ernized it."3 This re-evaluation of the Mexican Revolution is a some-
what expected occurrence, as it is consistent with a new interpretation 
of the Mexican political system. Prior to the middle 1960's, Mexico 
8 
9 
was generally regarded as an example of an imperfect democratic system. 
It was imperfect because the goals of the Revolution were not yet ful-
filled. This view of Mexico as in a transitional phase posited the 
expectation that future development would be in the direction of more 
democracy as the system matured. Generally, current opinion regarding 
Mexico denies that Mexico is an 11 imperf ect version of anything" and in-
stead alleges that it is essentially an example of an authoritarian 
regime. 4 The negation of Mexico as a flawed democratic model implies 
that the expectation that Mexico is evolving into a Western style demo-
cracy is also unfounded. Of course, the revisionist interpretation of 
Mexico's political system does not preclude Mexico from adopting demo-
cratic norms, but it does suggest that democracy is not inevitable in 
Mexico nor is it as likely as it was once thought. 
If there is a lack of consensus concerning the meaning of the Mexi-
can Revolution, it does not extend to the pre-revolutionary period. 
This is an area where there is substantial agreement among scholars. In 
I 
1877 General Porfirio Diaz became President of Mexico via a coup d'etat. 
I 
The advent of Diaz marked the beginning of a new era in Mexico's devel-
I 
opment. Diaz granted concessions to foreigners to attract capital to 
mine Mexico's natural resources, build railroads, and other public works. 
~ 
In fact, under Diaz, foreign holdings totaled more than Mexican holdings 
with United States citizens owning more property than all other for-
eigners combined. 5 Concentration of wealth was extreme with 834 indi-
viduals owning one-fourth of Mexico's land. 6 
I 
The philosophical basis for the Diaz regime was rooted in the posi-
tivism of Auguste Comte.7 
I 
Diaz surrounded himself with advisers known 
as 11 cientificos," who stressed the importance of political order and ma-
10 
terial progress over individual freedom and equality.a Therefore, in 
I 
defense of Diaz, some regarded him not so much the dictator, but rather 
the statesman, using: 
the only methods known to the economic and social sciences 
of his time, methods which are after all not too different 
from those used by developing countries today: that is, 
national planning and the importation of foreign capital 
and technical skills, while restraining popular drives to 
increase consumption.9 
,. 
Additionally, General Diaz did not personally enrich himself through his 
position of power, although many of his subordinates did amass consider-
able fortunes from the public treasury. 
I 
In the long run, several features of the Diaz regime served to un-
dermine its power base. First, as the regime evolved, it became more 
exclusionary. That is, wealth became more concentrated and entry into 
commercial activity was denied to an aspiring and expanding entrepre-
neur class. Thus, a rising Mexican middle class was prohibited from 
sharing in the fruits of the economic development. Since the benefits 
of economic development were reserved to foreign interests and a small 
/ 
inner-circle of Diaz's associates, discontent and resentment was wide 
spread among Mexico's emerging middle class. Secondly, the plight of 
the rural masses deteriorated thereby alienating this sector as well. 
/ 
To maintain order, Diaz established a particularly brutal rural police 
known as rurales. Furthermore, large land holding companies had dis-
possessed large numbers of peasants reducing them to peonage and a sub-
sistence standard of living. 
I 
Toward the end of the dictatorship, General Diaz attempted to re-
assert control over the influence of foreign investors. But these ef-
forts were too little too late. By the time Francisco I. Madero issued 
I 
his call for revolution, Diaz had alienated the major segments of Mexi-
11 
can society and the American business community operating in Mexico. 
The Revolution did not produce any clearly defined ideology. In 
part, this is due to the heterogeneous nature of the revolutionaries. 
It is commonplace to identify the various factions according to the 
prominent generals of the Revolution. In the North, there were the 
armies of Venustiano Carranza, Alvaro Obrego'n, and Francisco "Pancho" 
Villa. To the South, the major army was that of Emiliano Zapata. While 
it was personal charisma rather than ideology which provided the adhe-
sive to hold these armies together, Zapata did attempt to formulate an 
I 
ideology in his Plan de Ayala.10 With the common goal of Diaz's removal 
serving as the motivation for each faction, it is important to note that 
the revolutionary movement was hopelessly divided on other goals. For 
example, in the South, the revolutionary movement was primarily a peas-
ant movement concerned with the restoration of land to the peasants and 
their villages. In the North, the revolutionary movement was comprised 
I 
of landowners and merchants alienated by Diaz's preferential treatment 
to foreigners and his exclusive club of associates. Therefore, it is 
I 
not surprising that Diaz's downfall did not end the conflict in Mexico. 
The process of reconciliation proved to be beyond the ability of 
Madero. Madero, although honest and sincere, could not restore order 
and unite the various factions under his leadership. Ultimately, fight-
ing broke out in Mexico City between Madero's troops, led by General 
/ / 
Victoriano Huerta, and Felix Diaz (Porfirio Diaz's nephew). The United 
States ambassador, who was openly hostile toward the Madero regime, in-
/ 
tervened by negotiating a deal between Huerta and Felix Diaz. The plan 
called for Madero's removal and would place Huerta in the presidency and 
I 
Felix Diaz would be the pref erred presidential candidate in the next 
election. 
12 
As a result of this arrangement, Huerta seized power and executed 
Madero and his vice-president. To complicate the situation, newly in-
augurated President Wilson refused to recognize the Huerta government. 
Wilson threw his support to the Constitutionalist forces under Carranza 
and Villa who controlled northern Mexico. Thus, Wilson allowed munitions 
to be sent to Carranza and Villa, hoping to promote civil war and the 
overthrow of Huerta. 
Following an exchange of insults between Wilson and Huerta and an 
incident at the Mexican port of Tampico, President Wilson asked Congress 
for approval to occupy Veracruz to "secure respect for the U.S. 11 More 
likely, Wilson was hoping to hasten Huerta's downfall by cutting off an 
arms shipment to Veracruz from Germany. The intervention by Wilson 
posed a serious dilemma for the President. All of the competing factions 
in Mexico opposed the American action and yet Wilson could not withdraw 
the American forces until Huerta was removed or United States prestige 
would be damaged. War between the United States and Mexico was averted 
with the mediation of the dispute by the foreign ministers of Argentina, 
Brazil, and Chile. 
The resignation of Huerta in 1914, however, did not end the revolu-
tion. Venustiano Carranza, who succeeded Huerta, was opposed by his old 
rivals, Villa and Zapata. Eventually, Carranza was able to consolidate 
his power with the defeat of Villa and Zapata, only to be challenged 
later by Obregon. 
/ 
Subsequently, Obregon was proclaimed President in 
1920. Abiding by the revolutionary motto of "effective suffrage and no 
I 
reelection," Obregon turned over the presidency to president-elect 
Plutarco Elias Calles in 1924. Unfortunately, Obrego'n again sought the 
presidency in 1928. However, before he could take office, the president-
13 
elect was assassinated by a religious fanatic who was allegedly in the 
employ of Calles. Under those circumstances, it was impossible for 
Calles to attempt to succeed himself, therefore, Emilio Portes Gil was 
chosen to be provisional president for fourteen months. 
The stewardship of Emilio Portes Gil marked an important period of 
Mexico's political development. For it was during this period that Calles 
founded the political party which has ruled Mexico since its establish-
ment in 1929.11 Perhaps the greatest achievement in Mexico has been the 
institutionalization of the Mexican Revolution into a viable political 
system. The vehicle of the institutionalization process has been the 
ruling Institutional Revolutionary Party (Partido Revolucionario Insti-
tucional, or PRI). 
In founding the PRI, Calles was attempting to transfer political 
power from personalities to institutions. 12 But in doing so, Calles was 
also attempting to rule Mexican politics by controlling the party appa-
ratus. Nonetheless, the problem of succession of power was basically 
solved by establishing a political party which would provide stability 
and continuity. This was no small achievement, for as Samuel Huntington 
notes, the biggest threat to a one-party system is the problem of suc-
cession of power.13 By strictly adhering to the constitutional limita-
tion of one term, Mexico has not experienced a problem of succession of 
; I 
power since President Lazaro Cardenas asserted his independence of Calles 
and Calles was exiled to the United States. 
Although the PRI has undergone significant reorganization through 
the years, it is the party which has ruled Mexico continuously since 
Calles. In short, the PRI is the channel through which political con-
flict is resolved and the vehicle for those aspiring to political power. 
14 
The strategy pursued by the PRI in seeking cohesion in the Mexican poli-
tical system is a mixed policy of cooptation and repression.14 That is, 
if attempts to coopt political opposition fail, then these elements will 
be repressed. Thus, it is very difficult to attempt change by working 
outside the system and those who are coopted have a vested interest in 
preserving the status quo. Therefore, the ability of the regime to ac-
comodate change is limited. 
The organization of the PRI is on a tri-sectoral structure. The 
three groupings comprising the PRI are the labor, peasant, and popular 
/ 
sectors. (Originally, President Cardenas also established a military 
I 
sector, but it was disbanded by Cardenas' successor.) This organiza-
tional structure was established during the administration of President 
I 
Cardenas in an attempt to expand the power and participation of the peas-
antry and labor.15 
/ 
In effect, the reform minded Cardenas was seeking 
to consolidate his power by increasing the influence of those groups 
which were the most supportive of his policies. Theoretically, this 
arrangement should ensure adequate representation for the peasantry and 
the working class. 
/ 
Cardenas anticipated that the party's nominees for 
office would be drawn equally from the four sectors.16 Thus, after the 
various sectors had selected their candidates, the coalition would close 
ranks to support the party slate. However in reality, the popular sec-
tor and its extraparty associations dominate the PRI, limiting the abil-
ity of labor and peasants to affect policy decisions. 
Partially accounting for the domination of the PRI by the popular 
sector is the organizational structure of the labor and peasant sectors. 
The labor sector is organized around the Mexican Workers Confederation 
/ 
(Confederacion de Trabajadores de Mexico, or CTM). The CTM is a giant 
15 
government organized labor union. However, the leadership of the CTM 
is for the most part imposed from above rather than elected from below. 
Therefore, the role of the CTM leadership is not one of bargaining for 
benefits for labor, but the CTM works to assure labor support for the 
government.17 Thus, the CTM does not genuinely represent the interests 
of labor, but instead, its leadership tends to identify with the in-
terests of the government and big business. 
The second group, which is not adequately represented, is the peas-
antry. The peasantry is organized around a single organization, the 
; 
National Peasant Confederation (Confedercion Nacional Campesina, or CNC). 
The CNC, like the CTM, does not possess an effective voice within the PRI. 
Power in the CNC flows from the top down as top and middle level posi-
tions within the CNC are appointive. 18 Also the general plight of the 
peasant in Mexico contributes to his lack of political clout. In short, 
the peasantry needs the government more than the government needs the 
support of the peasant to remain in power. Paradoxically, the peasant 
sector, which receives the fewest benefits from the government, is the 
sector which is tradionally the most supportive of the PRI. The pre-
ceding characterization of the labor and peasant sectors does not neces-
sarily imply that these sectors are without political significance. But 
rather, the leadership of these sectors has been coopted into the system 
while the political power of the popular sector has appreciated. 
The dominant position of the popular sector within the PRI is re-
flective of the interests in the economy it represents. That is, the 
popular sector is a catch-all category which basically identifies with 
the aspirations of the middle class and big business. The popular sector 
of the PRI is quite heterogeneous, representing groups such as doctors, 
16 
lawyers, teachers, merchants, large land owners, and various commercial 
interests. The popular sector differs from the labor and peasant sec-
tors, however, in that the popular sector has been able to develop some-
what more independently of government control than the other sectors. 
The popular sector is organized around the National Confederation of 
Popular Organizations (Confedercidn Nacional de Organizaciones Populares, 
or CNOP). And as Johnson states, 
Whereas in the cases of labor and the agrarian sectors 
there is a legally prescribed relationship and control 
between the national government and those sectorial organ-
izations, the CNOP has been allowed to develop with relative 
independence since the group was founded in 1943.19 
Therefore, this relative independence means that the CNOP is more likely 
to be the recipient of government benefits in securing CNOP allegiance 
to government policies than the other sectors. 
There is considerable debate over the relative power of the private 
economic sector vis-a-vis the PRr. 20 One view maintains that the private 
economic sector, through the CNOP, controls the PRI and thus the Mexican 
state. According to this view, the PRI could not exercise independence 
of the economic elites even if it desired to do so. The other view ar-
gues that, yes, there has been an "alliance for profits11 21 between the 
PRI and the economic elite. Nevertheless, the PRI still retains the op-
tion of asserting its independence if the political elite should decide 
that conditions warrant it. Regardless of viewpoint, the private economic 
sector exerts tremendous influence over the PRI. Also the fate of the 
~ 
proposed Echeverria reforms, which will be discussed later, seems to in-
dicate that the economic elite may indeed be the dominant partner in this 
relationship. 
The favored position of the popular sector within the PRI assumes 
17 
significance when one realizes that the PRI is the party-turned-
government. A viable opposition party does not exist in Mexico. Al-
though minor opposition parties exist on both the political left and 
right of the PRI, the party which most resembles an opposition party is 
/ 
the National Action Party (Partido Accion Nacional, or PAN). But, the 
efforts of PAN to become a genuine opposition party have been, thus far, 
stymied. PAN, whose support is basically drawn from clerically oriented, 
middle-class, urban dwellers, enjoyed relative success in the early 
1970's. More recently, support for PAN has declined. In the 1976 presi-
dential election, for example, PAN did not field an official candidate 
for president primarily as a result of intraparty conflict. 
On the political left, the Mexican Connnunist Party (Partido Com-
unista Mexicano, or PCM) appears to be the major potential opposition 
party. PCM was granted legal recognition in 1978, therefore, it may be 
too early to assess the party's actual strength. PCM polled approxi-
mately five to ten percent of the vote in the 1979 Congressional elec-
tions which was comparable to PAN's share of the vote.22 Nonetheless, 
the existence of minor parties in the Mexican political system does not 
alter the one-party authoritarian character of Mexico's political struc-
ture. Perhaps more importantly, Mexico's one party rule cannot provide 
a "genuine sense of participation for the Mexican electorate. 11 23 This 
alienation of the electorate, due to the absence of meaningful partici-
pation, will surely increase as the PRI becomes more detached from the 
goals of the Mexican Revolution. 
At the apex of the PRI and political power in Mexico is the 
President. As one scholar notes, "The President of Mexico is more power-
ful .than his American counterpart, in terms of personal discretion in 
18 
decision-making.24 Sources of power for the Mexican President are de-
rived from his leadership position within the PRI and the Constitution 
of 1917, which grants the President a broad range of powers. Also con-
tributing to presidential power is the role of the Mexican Congress in 
the political system, that is, the Congress tends to be subservient and 
functions primarily as a rubber-stamp to the President. The Mexican 
judiciary, while occasionally exercising independence, lacks the inde-
pendence of its American counterpart and thus is limited in its ability 
to affect public policy. 
The Mexican President also enjoys a special symbolic status because 
of the esteem bestowed upon the office by the Mexican populace. Perhaps 
due to the authoritarian and paternalistic Mexican culture, the Mexican 
President is viewed as the ultimate father figure who benevolently 
directs the fate of the Mexican people. Indeed, prior to President 
I 
Diaz Ordaz, it was a tradition that the President and his immediate 
family were immune from public criticism. Despite the constitutional 
limitation of one six year term, the Mexican President is clearly in 
possession of great authority as the FRI is subordinate to the President 
a majority of the time.25 
The selection of the Mexican President is an interesting process 
where each President selects his successor. The party functionaries 
may participate in this process, but the final decision rests with the 
President. Thus, even with the no-reelection principle, the Mexican 
system practices a type of "continuismo 11 since each president will be a 
member of the PRI.26 But this selection process is not intended to, nor 
does it actually, provide Mexico with presidents of uniform ideology. 
Instead Mexico·has, within the PRI spectrum, chosen presidential candi-
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dates of greatly divergent ideological hues. Martin C. Needler has 
identified a pendulum effect in the selection of Mexican presidents.27 
He asserts that Mexican presidents alternate between liberal and con-
servative orientations in a somewhat consistent and predictable fashion. 
Such a pendulum effect is the result of the inclusiveness of the PRI and 
its attempts to appease the extremes within the party.28 
While very powerful, the power of the Mexican President is nonethe-
less limited. The limits are not so much constitutional or statutory, 
but rather are more informal in nature. The proposed economic reforms 
~ 
of President Echeverria provide an apt illustration. The thrust of the 
,, 
Luis Echeverria reforms was a mild attempt to reduce the economic gap 
,, 
between the wealthy and poor. Echeverria proposed tighter restrictions 
on foreign investors, agriculture reforms, expanded public service, and 
,, 
higher taxes on corporations. In effect, Echeverria was attempting to 
achieve modest income redistribution at the expense of rapid aggregate 
economic growth. However, Mexican industrialists and financiers viewed 
,, 
the Echeverria reforms with alarm. As a result, domestic investment was 
withheld causing serious economic stagnation. Furthermore, allied with 
the conservative faction of the PRI, Mexico's economic elite was success-
,, 
ful in preventing the implementation of Echeverria's reform policies by 
/ 
fomenting political unrest as a means to undercut Echeverria's authority. 
The ability of the conservative economic elite to generate political 
/ 
and economic instability ultimately provided a challenge that Echeverria 
could not successfully meet. The end result is that when the economic 
elite in Mexico perceives its interests to be threatened, its political 
and economic power rivals the Mexican government. This is a fact of 
/ 
Mexican life that President Lopez Portillo apparently understands. One 
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of the first goals of the Lopez Portillo Administration was to reconcile 
with the business community and thus re-establish confidence in the 
Mexican economy. As a consequence, foreign and domestic investment has 
/ 
accelerated under Lopez Portillo. 
Since Mexico is subject to one-party rule (hence, winning candidates 
are determined prior to the election), the casual observer might inquire 
as to the utility and purpose of elections. The importance of elections 
should not be overlooked in Mexico or any one-party state. The function 
of elections in modern Mexico is one of providing legitimacy to the re-
gime. In other words, the stability of the regime is dependent upon the 
PRI maintaining legitimacy. Electoral victory provides this cloak of 
legitimacy and it is for this reason that the PRI cannot tolerate real 
opposition. Since the PRI is the party-qua-government, the strength of 
Mexico's authoritarian regime depends upon the strength of the PRI. 
Therefore, the PRI must associate itself with the goals and aspirations 
of the Mexican Revolution. Accordingly, the PRI claims to be the only 
true heir to the Mexican Revolution. In doing so, political support 
for the Revolution is transferred to the PRI. Any dissociation of the 
PRI from the symbols of the Revolution will serve to undermine the PRI. 
But the ability of the PRI to manipulate the symbols of the Revo-
lution for political advantage is decreasing. For example, the passage 
of time puts distance between the leaders of the state and the ideals 
of the Revolution.29 Another factor working to dissociate the PRI from 
the liberal-democratic themes of the Revolution is the rising political 
awareness resulting from urbanization and modernization. That is, the 
rural population has traditionally been the segment of the population 
which has been most susceptable to manipulation by the PRI. Therefore, 
21 
as Mexico experiences what Karl Deutsch has referred to as "social mo-
bilization," the ability of the PRI. to manipulate political imagery will 
become more problematic. Essentially, elections perform the same func-
, 
tion today as during the dictatorship of Porfirio Diaz, the reaffirmation 
of support for the regime. However, the social-economic conditions of 
Mexico have undergone extensive change. Increases in literacy, urbaniza-
tion, and modernization are transforming Mexico from a rural society to 
an urban one. Therefore, the transformation from a traditional society 
to a modern society will likely reduce the PRI's base of support. 
Thus far, the PRI has been successful in coopting political oppo-
sition before it becomes a serious threat to the regime. The 1978 elec-
toral reforms are reflective of this strategy. Under these reforms, 
the Chamber of Deputies was enlarged from 300 to 400. The additional 
100 seats are allotted to the PRI's opposition according to proportional 
representation. However, the number of seats a party is eligible for 
under the proportional system is reduced if it wins over 90 seats in the 
300 winner-take-all districts. These reforms give the appearance of 
liberalizing the political system while at the same time also ensuring 
that the PRI will retain a comfortable majority in the Chamber of Depu-
ties. These reforms, however, could backfire if the opposition should 
increase its strength beyond a tolerable level.30 If the regime becomes 
threatened by the increase in strength of opposition parties, it will 
have no alternative but to repress its opposition. As noted earlier, 
the PRI cannot tolerate meaningful opposition. But by coopting political 
opposition into the system, the PRI may be able to defuse the opposition 
before it poses a challenge. 
Another aspect of the Mexican political system which merits atten-
22 
tion is political alienation. Political alienation in Mexico is a multi-
faceted phenomenon which has no single root cause. One factor, of course, 
contributing to political alienation are the deficiencies of the elec-
toral process. As van Sauer notes, it was dissatisfaction with both PAN 
and the PRl which led to 10 million voters remaining home in 1973.31 
Perhaps, however, as long as this electoral alienation is not mobilized 
by the PRl's opposition, low levels of voter participation will be to 
the advantage of the PRl. On the basis of his survey of Mexico City, 
Kenneth Coleman concludes that efforts by the PRl to mobilize urban 
voters will prove to be counterproductive.32 This situation poses some-
what of a dilemma for the PRl. Historically, the PRl has depended upon 
the mass mobilization of the electorate for support. lf the PRI's base 
of support is eroding, it may be that the PRI's support will depend, to 
a greater extent, upon political apathy. Certainly, from the PRI's 
perspective, this is an unhealthy and potentially dangerous turn of 
events. 
A second factor related to political alienation in Mexico undoubt-
ably is the persistence of corruption. The negative impact of corruption 
on the political regime is impossible to measure. Nonetheless, it is 
reasonable to speculate on some of the probable consequences. Institu-
tionalized corruption reinforces the belief of the Mexican that he cannot 
effectively contribute to political decisions and it also means that the 
actual exercise of power is more likely to be arbitary than rational or 
equitable. It contributes to his fatalism and hopelessness. Those who 
possess power must be corrupt, or how else did they acquire power? 
Therefore, to be successful, one must be corrupt, even at the expense of 
exploiting one's fellow citizens. Perhaps in previous times corruption 
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performed a useful function in Mexico's political development, but today 
it is clearly dysfunctional.33 Furthermore, "in Mexico the informal 
structures are likely to take priority over the legal ones. 11 34 The 
persistence of corruption will continue to impede the development of 
legitimacy for political institutions and the system as a whole. With-
out legitimacy, the regime will be susceptible to challenge during times 
of economic and political crisis. 
A partial explanation of the authoritarian character of Mexico's 
political system may lie in the political culture of Mexico. Many writers 
have noted the authoritarian behavior of the Mexican. But Needler asserts 
that the authoritarianism of Mexico is different from the traditional 
authoritarian personality of Germany.35 In Germany, authority may be 
used oppressively, but it is consistent rather than arbitrary. In Mexi-
co, the psychological foundation for authoritarianism is vastly different. 
Mexican cultural traits include, for example: submissiveness, fatalism, 
cynicism, lack of hope or ability to change things, and also a lack of 
concern for the external material world. Possibly, the Mexican authori-
tarian personality, predisposed to deference and subservience, is a 
remnant of traditional peasant society.36 Studies indicate that Mexicans 
born in rural areas significantly exhibit more authoritarian tendencies 
than those born in urban areas.37 Another feature of the Mexican per-
sonality is the cult of male superiority, or machismo. Politically, 
machismo is manifested in the ability to dominate or impose one's will 
on others, exploitation, and a preoccupation with power. Thus, machismo 
would seem to be consistent with the authoritarian personality.38 
Thus in Mexico one observes an authoritarian political structure 
coupled with an authoritarian political culture. Whether one is the 
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result of the other is largely irrelevant, more importantly, culture and 
political institutions augment one another. In the words of Evelyn 
Stevens, Mexico has "a background of experimentation with liberal-con-
stitutional forms superimposed on value systems more consistent with 
authoritarianism. 1139 In Mexico, the liberal-constitutional forms appear 
to be more superficial than real. 
The basic value of any political system is the maintenance of sta-
bility. Mexico's political system has preserved relative stability for 
60 years. The success of the system has relied upon the ability of the 
ruling PRI to coopt opposition and repress dissent. Also central to the 
PRI's maintenance of power is the ability of PRI to sustain legitimacy. 
To this end, the PRI identifies with the social-justice themes of the 
Revolution and actively seeks reaffirmation of support through the elec-
toral process. In the past, the success of the PRI at the polls has 
reflected the ability of the party to manipulate large segments of the 
population by advancing revolutionary rhetoric. In short, the PRI has 
successfully institutionalized the Revolution. 
But Mexico's political institutions are beginning to exhibit signs 
of strain. Table I provides an indication of the increasing political 
violence of the late 1970's. Violence and alienation are the manifesta-
tions of this degenerative process. Urbanization and a rising urban 
proletariat will reduce the ability of the regime to manipulate political 
symbols for political support. In effect, the revolutionary party be-
comes a post-revolutionary party and, as such, it is more difficult to 
justify its existence on the basis of ideology. Consequently, the power 
of the party declines vis-a-vis other institutions, particularly the 
bureaucracy or the military. More important in the Mexican case, how-
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ever, is the fact that the regime has become calcified. The system has 
stagnated which results in an inability to respond to new problems. 
The next two chapters will focus on the more serious problems confront-
ing contemporary Mexico. 
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TABLE I 
MEXICAN AFFAIRS AS REPORTED IN THE NEW:YORK. TIMES, 1970-1979 
Category 1970/71 1972/73 1974/75 1976/77 1978/79 
Kidnap/Assassi- 2 3 8 2 2 
nation 
Strike 0 0 0 2 2 
Demonstration 3 0 1 3 3 
Guerrilla 
Activity 5 5 9 3 1 
Demonstration 
Abroad 0 0 1 1 1 
Corruption/Poli-
tical Scandal 0 0 1 1 3 
Riot 0 0 1 0 1 
Bombing 0 1 3 3 0 
Hijacking 0 1 1 0 0 
Political 
Shootout 0 1 3 5 0 
Local Revolt 0 0 1 0 0 
Peasant Unrest/ 
Land Invasion 0 0 1 1 3 
Repression 3 1 2 7 5 
Total Anti-System 
Phenomena By Year 13 12 32 28 21 
SOURCE: The New York Times Index, 1970-1979 
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CHAPTER III 
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND INCOME INEQUALITY 
Since 1940, Mexico has experienced impressive aggregate economic 
growth. During this period, Mexico's Gross Domestic Product (GDP) has 
risen by an average of 6 percent per year. However, this dynamic, eco-
nomic performance, has been achieved at high social costs. In Mexico, 
economic development is coupled with severe income inequality. 
Mexico's drive toward modernization has placed emphasis upon 
capital-intensive rather than labor-intensive forms of production. 
According to Hellman, Mexico has pursued the "trickledown" theory of 
economic growth.l That is, to achieve rapid industrialization, Mexico 
has relied upon capital-intensive development to provide the high prof its 
necessary to raise domestic savings and investment. In turn, these 
profits must be reinvested to maintain the rapid economic growth. A 
corollary to this strategy is that since profits are used to spur new 
investment, wages must be kept low. But eventually, the economic de-
velopment will be beneficial to all segments of society, that is the 
benefits will "trickle down." As a consequence of this policy, employ-
ment has not kept pace with economic growth. 
In a country with chronic unemployment, it is therefore prudent to 
examine in a little greater detail the emphasis placed upon capital-
intensive development. Capital-intensive forms of production are one 
consequence of Mexico's drive toward industrialization through a policy 
of import substitution. 2 The policy of industrialization via import 
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substitution provides for the replacement of imports with domestically 
manufactured goods. In turn, this necessitates a protectionist economic 
structure for the domestic manufacturing sector. Thus, domestic industry 
is protected from external competition and provided an environment con-
ducive to profitable investment. While import substitution is an effec-
tive means of promoting industrialization, it is not necessarily an 
efficient process.3 Protectionist policies allow the affected industries 
to produce inefficiently, thereby resulting in higher costs and thus 
prices. Another feature of the import substitution policy is the rela-
tive cheapening of the price of capital vis-a-vis labor.4 Therefore, 
Mexican bu8inessmen are encouraged to adopt capital-intensive technolo-
gies rather than labor-intensive ones. 
The policy of import substitution also has a negative effect upon 
income distribution. The impact is two-fold. First, protectionist 
policies, by encouraging capital-intensive forms of production, also 
promotes an oligopolistic or monopolistic domestic market which results 
in a further concentration of wealth. Secondly, by utilizing capital 
rather than labor, the demand for labor declines which tends to depress 
wages. Therefore, import substitution aggravates the problem of income 
inequality. 
Another unattractive feature of the policy of import substitution 
is that it further increases Mexico's dependence on foreign capital, 
and thus the United States. Import substitution partially substituted 
the importation of goods with foreign investment and Mexico's trade 
deficit has been financed through external indebtedness. This situation 
has tended to increase the "external disequilibrium" in the Mexican 
economy. 5 This means that the Mexican developmental model reinforces 
32 
the need for foreign capital in order to promote growth. 
The Mexican policy on foreign investment is a unique contradiction 
between idealistic rhetoric and pragmatic realism. On the one hand, 
Mexico officially is sensitive to excessive foreign investment and for-
eign control over the economy. But Mexican policy makers also realize 
that economic development will require foreign capital. These seemingly 
contradictory goals are resolved through the policy of "mexicanization" 
of the economy. Judith Hellman has found the policy of "mexicanization" 
offers little real control over foreign investments.6 According to 
Hellman, this policy was intended to encourage foreign investment while 
subjecting that investment to certain restrictions. But there are many 
loopholes left open which allow the foreign enterprise to circumvent 
control. For example, under the "mexicanization" policy, majority stock 
must be held by Mexican nationals in certain sectors of the economy. In 
reality, a foreign firm can easily secure an exception by a variety of 
means, thus allowing great leeway in the implementation of the law. If 
a company cannot secure an exception or if an established firm is forced 
to sell stock, it still will not necessarily have to relinquish control. 
A wide-spread practice in Mexico is for a foreign firm simply to colla-
borate with a native in the symbolic use of his name as the majority 
stockholder. There are handsome profits for the Mexican businessman to 
make as a "name-lender" or (preslanombre). Thus, Hellman concludes that 
at times, Mexico has chosen to ignore violations of its "mexicanization" 
policy. 
The impact of foreign investment in Mexico stems not only from the 
dollar amounts, but also from the concentration of investment in certain 
sectors of the economy. There are some scholars who maintain that for-
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eign enterprises (the United States accounts for 80 percent of all for-
eign investment in Mexico) possess an exaggerated amount of economic 
power due to their control of key sectors of the economy. According to 
Lorenzo Meyer, while foreign capital accounts for about 10 percent of 
the Mexican GDP, foreign capital is almost exclusively invested in the 
manufacturing sector.7 Kenneth Johnson maintains that this concentration 
in the manufacturing sector by foreign capital results in the ability of 
foreign capital to have great impact on the rest of the economy.8 Thus, 
the foreign firm tends to invest in the most dynamic sectors of the eco-
nomy and exerts tremendous influence in those areas. Of the 400 largest 
corporations operating in Mexico, more than half are owned or heavily 
influenced by non-Mexicans.9 Another source of power and profit for the 
United States corporation in Mexico is the control by United States com-
panies over the use of patents in Mexican industry. It is estimated 
that 80 percent of all patents used in Mexican industry are United States 
owned.10 From the Mexican perspective, American industry's control over 
patents prevents Mexican subsidiaries from developing trade abroad and 
discourages Mexican industry in general from making its own technological 
advances. 
Another example of the power of foreign firms is the practice of 
requiring Mexican subsidiaries to purchase materials for manufacture 
from the parent company, often at inflated prices. One United Nations 
study found that some foreign owned companies charged their Mexican 
subsidiary in excess of 500 percent of the market price for these ma-
terials .11 Mexicans also worry about capital flight from Mexico. Not 
only do foreign investors extract more capital from Mexico than they 
invest, but in times of economic crisis there is also the tendency for 
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Mexicans to send their money out of Mexico and deposit it in the United 
States.12 
Further complicating Mexico's economic situation is Mexico's over 
dependence on one external market for trade. Seventy percent of all 
Mexican exports are destined to the United States, and 60 percent of 
Mexican imports are provided by the United States. As a result, the 
vitality of Mexico's economy is directly dependent upon the health of 
the United States economy. In addition to Mexico's dependence upon the 
United States economy, Mexico has experienced a balance of payments prob-
lem in recent years. The balance of payments deficit necessitated aus-
tere economic policies at home, heavy borrowing from foreign banks and 
a $1.2 billion loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 1976. 
These policies culminated in the devaluation of the peso in 1976. Also, 
Mexico's economy, which had been experiencing impressive growth, became 
quite sluggish with increased unemployment and a fall in the GDP (See 
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Index (CPI) rising an average of 20 percent per year between 1970 and 
1979.13 Mexico's economic growth rate had improved in 1978, but infla-
tion and unemployment still persisted. Also, Mexico's foreign debt had 
expanded to an estimated 30 billion dollars and Mexico's balance of 
payments deficit in 1979 had risen to 3 billion dollars. 14 
Mexico's drive toward industrialization, like any nation in the 
process of development, is dependent upon the reduction of the peasantry 
and the number of persons employed in the agricultural sector of the 
economy. In terms of the proportion of GDP the agricultural sector 
accounted for 8.5 percent in 1979.15 More problematic, however, is the 
fact that nearly 40 percent of the labor force is employed in agriculture. 
Consequently, the processes of modernization and urbanization have re-
sulted in increasing the deprivation of the rural masses. The number of 
landless peasants is increasing while the average number of work days of 
rural laborers is decreasing.16 Also, notwithstanding sporadic land 
reform, the trend in Mexico is one of increasing the concentration of 
land ownership rather than a more equitable distribution. Accompaning 
this concentration of land is an expected concentration of income within 
the agricultural sector. In fact, the agricultural sector in Mexico has 
the most unequal distribution of income of all sectors of the economy.17 
The prospects for the Mexican peasant do not appear to be very promising. 
First, it is unlikely that the government will effect serious land re-
form as the government views the large land holdings as more productive 
and the political influence of the large land owner militates against 
the break-up of these farms. Secondly, there is simply no new land left 
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to distribute. For example, during the Diaz Ordaz administration (1964 
to 1970), 91 percent of the land the peasants received was not arable.18 
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As noted earlier, Mexico's economic development has fostered ex-
treme income inequality. In fact, concentration of wealth has increased 
in Mexico to the point where income inequality is as great today as in 
the pre-revolutionary Mexico of 1910. 19 The egalitarian-social-justice 
theme of the Mexican Revolution has largely been abandoned for a policy 
,/ 
of rapid economic growth. In other words, since Cardenas, Mexico's 
economic growth has been coupled with a reconcentration of wealth. As 
David Felix notes, the material well-being of the poorest 40 percent 
has remained virtually unchanged since 1910, while the top 20 percent 
has been the recipient of the bulk of the material gains.20 In compari-
son with 43 other less developed countries (LDC's), only 4 countries 
had an income distribution which was more skewed. 21 Hence, few countries 
have a greater contrast between poverty and luxury than Mexico. 
In short, Mexico has experienced economic growth without develop-
ment.22 That is, Mexico's rise in per capita GDP becomes meaningless 
when other economic goals (employment, income redistribution, and inde-
pendence from foreign markets and capital) are sacrificed in the process. 
This is precisely the condition of Mexico's economic growth. High in-
creases in per capita output are coupled with rising unemployment, re-
concentration of wealth, and increasing dependence on the United States. 
Further undermining the economic condition of the poor is a high rate of 
inflation, since the economic costs of inflation are not distributed 
equally. The Mexican wage earner has experienced a decline in purchasing 
power during the 1970's as pay increases have not kept pace with infla-
tion.23 
Ironically, recent research of the Mexican economic model suggests 
that the effects of income redistribution on economic growth through the 
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alteration of capital and import needs would be slight.24 In other 
words, conventional theory maintains that the redistribution of income 
leads to a fall in the rate of savings and thus a decline in economic 
growth due to a lack of capital formation. However, it may well be that 
the decline in savings effects will be at least partially offset by 
other effects resulting from redistribution.25 If high aggregate growth 
is not dependent upon income inequality, then this certainly would bol-
ster the egalitarian argument for income redistribution. 
Fundamentally, the unequal distribution of income stems from an 
unequal distribution of political power in the Mexican polity. The 
urban working class and the rural peasant have no effective political 
organizations through which they can place demands upon the government 
in pursuit of their economic interests. The political parties, trade 
unions, and peasant organizations are unable to function as pressure 
groups in the manner which is associated with Western liberal democra-
cies. Rather than place legitimate demands on the government, these 
groups are manipulated and controlled by the government. Therefore, 
political and economic decisions benefit those segments of society which 
are organized and thus possess political and economic power. 
It is important to note that while material benefits have not 
trickled down to the majority of Mexicans, some social benefits have. 
Income inequality is the same today as in 1910, but literacy, life ex-
pectancy, and urbanization have increased. Certainly, this has also 
increased the expectations of the average Mexican. He is also probably 
more aware of his relative deprivation and therefore potentially more 
susceptible to social and political mobilization. Poverty breeds ali-
enation. In light of the "rising expectations" of the Mexican worker 
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and peasant and the concomitant inability of the present regime to ful-
fill these expectations, the economic system is one source of instability 
in Mexico's future. 
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CHAPTER IV 
POPULATION PRESSURES AND EMIGRATION 
Despite reports that the rate of population growth may have declined 
in recent years, 1 a population explosion is perhaps the most serious 
problem confronting Mexico (see Tables III and IV). When President 
/ 
Lopez Portillo's term expires in 1982, Mexico will have a population 
of 75~78 million of which one-third will reside in Mexico City. Mexi-
co's rate of population growth is double that of China and one percent 
higher than that of India. Even if Mexico's birth rate should decline 
in the near future, her population will double in twenty years. These 
predictions become more ominous when viewed in light of the extreme 
poverty in Mexico. In 1976, the National Institute of Nutrition reported 
that 5 out of 6 Mexicans were undernourished and that 85 percent of the 
goods in Mexico was consumed by 18 percent of the population. 2 Mexico's 
agricultural sector has been unable to increase production to meet the 
increased demand for foodstuffs. In the decade of 1970-1979, per capita 
harvested area declined by 20 percent in Mexico.3 As a result, it has 
become increasingly necessary for Mexico to import food. Since land 
under cultivation is only expanding at a rate of 1 percent a year, the 
importation of large quantities of food should continue, if not increase, 
in the future.4 
Food is the most basic need that Mexico's expanding population will 
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42 
Source: Ansley J. Coale, "Population Growth and Economic Development: 
The Case of Mexico," Foreign Affairs, 56 (January 1978). 
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More schools, hospitals, housing and jobs must be provided, therefore, 
population growth cannot be evaluated in isolation from an overall per-
spective of Mexican development. It is not the absolute size of Mexico's 
population which is significant, but rather, it is the ability of Mexi-
co's political and economic system to absorb it. For instance, Mexico's 
economic system currently generates 300,000 new jobs a year. However, 
over 1 million Mexicans are entering the work force each year.5 Al-
though figures vary, a reasonable estimate would be that 40-50 percent 
of Mexico's population is either unemployed or underemployed. The in-
ability of Mexico's economic system to provide adequate employment ex-
plains why 10 percent of Mexico's population lives and works in the 
United States. 
The relationship between economic development and population growth 
is not entirely conclusive. Professor Ansley Coale has identified two 
traditional views of population growth and economic development.6 One 
view holds that rapid population growth will simply serve to negate 
gains made by economic development. Economic growth, then, enables 
developing countries to support larger populations while the standard of 
living remains constant or even deteriorates. Thus, in Malthusian fash-
ion, population growth constitutes a trap for developing countries and 
efforts at economic development are likely to be ineffectual. The 
counterposition, according to Coale, is one of placing emphasis on eco-
nomic growth, the world can support larger populations. Also, as so-
ciety becomes industrialized, birth rates will decline thereby reducing 
both poverty and population growth. Since Mexico is experiencing rapid 
economic development with no reduction in population growth, Coale sur-
mises that the solution lies in strong population control measures. 
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Lawrence C. Stedman asserts that redistributing wealth is the key 
to reducing birth rates. 7 Stedman maintains that poverty and hunger are 
not necessarily caused by not enough food and too many people. As an 
example, Stedman cited the United States where 10 to 12 million people 
are estimated to be either starving or sick because they cannot afford 
to eat. This is, of course, in spite of the fact that the United States 
has-an adequate food supply. Thus Stedman says, "To eliminate hunger, 
it is not enough simply to produce great amounts of food and to lower 
fertility rates; one must also change the way goods and purchasing power 
are distributed. 11 8 In short, Stedman's argument is that the more egali-
tarian the distribution of wealth, the lower the birth rate. Secondly, 
income redistribution and land reform also help to feed people by al-
lowing the people to produce food on their own land rather than working 
the land for a large land owner at subsistence wages. To the extent 
that Stedman's argument is correct, it has great applicability in the 
case of Mexico. As noted in Chapter III, few countries have a more 
unequal distribution of income than Mexico. 
There are, however, cultural, religious, and economic obstacles 
which will impede any attempts at population control in Mexico. Rooted 
in the Mexican cultural tradition is the notion of machismo. That is, 
one's manliness is determined by his sexual virility. Therefore, the 
more children a man has, the more macho he feels. Secondly, since 
Mexico is predominantly Catholic, the papal encyclical against birth 
control may have a negative effect on curbing population growth. How-
ever, the impact of the church on population control may be less than 
expected because of the historic antagonism between Church and State 
in Mexico, the secularization of education, and the decline in general 
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of the influence of the Church. Nevertheless, one might expect the 
Church to have considerable influence over those who are deeply reli-
gious, especially in the rural areas. In addition to the Catholic Church, 
both PAN and PCM are opposed to birth control. The opposition of PAN 
to birth control reflects its support of the Church while PCM has adopted 
the Marxist view that birth control is a: 
Yankee, Protestant, capitalistic plot to hold down the 
number of Latin American (and Third World brown-skinned) 
people, so that the world economic and political power 
will not shift from the Northern to the Southern hemis-
phere, from the rich to the poor nations.9 
There is little reason to suspect that either PAN or PCM opposition to 
birth control has any significant impact upon Mexico's masses.IO Fi-
nally, the third obstacle to effective birth control is economic in 
nature. It is simply the fact that, in many developing nations, child-
ren are an economic asset rather than an economic burden. Even though 
the family may exist in extreme poverty, the children contribute more 
to the family by way of income or chores that they perform than they 
cost to feed, house, and clothe. While this perhaps does not apply to 
all of Mexico, it does apply to at least some of Mexico's poor families. 
Official policies directed toward birth control are very recent and 
modest. It was not until 1973 that the Mexican government launched a 
program of family planning. Even if successful, the impact of these 
efforts certainly will not be felt for some years to come. The approach 
of the Mexican government has been one of a purely technical nature. 
That is, the Mexican government is promoting birth control through the 
establishment of family planning clinics which provide information and 
free contraceptive devices. The government has not, however, launched 
any programs to reform political and social impediments to birth con-
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trol (e.g., land reform or income redistribution). Therefore, for those 
who feel the solution to population growth is social and political, as 
well as technica1,ll the Mexican approach is clearly insufficient. 
Another flaw of Mexico's family planning clinics is their limited ac-
cessibility. Alisky estimates that only 26 percent of Mexico's females 
live close enough to the clinics to regularly use the birth control 
service.12 
Coupled with a fast growing population, Mexico is also experiencing 
a relative decline in her peasant population. Mexico's rural population 
(residents in areas with a population of 2,500 or less) has decreased 
from 58 percent (1970) to 40 percent (1979).13 Precipitating this shift 
has been a migration from the rural areas to urban areas in search of 
employment. Employment opportunities in the cities, while for the most 
part scarce, are higher paying and more abundant. Modernization of 
agriculture and large land holdings have resulted in forcing the Mexican 
peasant from the land to the cities. 
It should be noted that there are glaring disparities between urban 
and rural Mexico. Per capita income in metropolitan areas is 4 times 
greater than that of rural areas.14 According to Pablo Gonzalez Casanova, 
Mexico is a dual society consisting of two groups, one marginal and the 
other participant.15 This marginal population has not been integrated 
into Mexican society. It is less well-fed, less educated, less pros-
perous, and predominately rural. Indeed, Gonzalez Casanova asserts 
that the marginal population in Mexico is the victim of internal colo-
nialism.16 While this marginal population is declining proportionally, 
it is increasing in absolute numbers. This situation tends to cloud 
the issue of Mexico's rural poverty, especially since the gap between 
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the haves and have-nots is widening. 
At the bottom of Mexico's marginal population is the Indian. Mexi-
co's Indian population poses a complex and perplexing social and poli-
tical problem for Mexico. As a societal outcast, the Indian becomes 
vulnerable to exploitation and discrimination. Gonzalez Casanova pro-
vides an insight to the Indian's condition: 
In general terms, whites and mestizos (both citizens and 
authorities) consider their Indian fellow citizens as in-
ferior, and treat them with a roughness comparable to that 
of the Spanish conquerors. The way in which the authori-
ties view the Indian, how they make him suffer, amuse 
themselves at his expense, feel more intelligent than he, 
humiliate him, make him feel uneasy, attack him, treat him 
with excessive familiarity, these are all forms liked to 
the violence of domination and to colonial exploitation.17 
In sum, Mexico is struggling with intractable population problems. 
The present population control measures are more cosmetic than real, as 
fundamental structural reforms do not appear to be forthcoming. The 
economic system is unable to keep pace with the demands for employment, 
housing, food, schools, and all the various goods and services, both 
private and public, which Mexico's population growth creates. Exacerba-
ting the problem is the existence of a marginal population which is 
unassimilated, culturally traditional, and primarily rural. It is 
against this background that Mexico's solution to population pressures 
assumes substance. Central to managing Mexico's population problem is 
the emigration of millions of her citizens to the United States in 
search of employment. 
The United States Census Bureau recently reported that, at any one 
time, no more than 3 million Mexicans are in the United States ille-
gally.18 This figure seems somewhat conservative as most informed es-
timates place the number of Mexicans residing illegally in the United 
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States in the six to eight million range. Regardless of the source of 
one's estimate, the significance of the Mexican migration northward is 
not lost. 
For Mexico, emigration of her workers to the United States provides 
an escape valve releasing pressures placed on the system. Mexico views 
less restrictive United States immigration policies as a means of re-
lieving pressures from her domestic problems of poverty, unemployment, 
and population growth. In fact, many writers have argued that the phe-
nomenon of Mexican migration northward is a modern restatement of the 
"Safety Value Theory" of the 19th Century. According to this theory, 
the immigration to the United States of Irish, German, Eastern European, 
and Mediterranean workers relieved population pressures abroad while 
providing a cheap labor supply for America's industrial development. 
Also of importance is the fact that dollar remittances from Mexican 
workers in the United States help to alleviate Mexico's balance of pay-
ments deficit. For these reasons, the problem of illegal aliens in the 
United States can be viewed as a direct extension of domestic Mexican 
politics and the inability of the political regime to deal with domestic 
problems.19 Therefore, curbing the influx of illegal aliens into the 
United States will mean that the focus of correctional action must be 
directed at present conditions in Mexico, not the United States. 20 In 
other words, unilateral actions taken by the United States, such as pro-
secuting employers of illegal aliens, attempting to close the border, 
requiring national identity cards, will be ineffectual and very likely 
counterproductive. Unless the conditions of poverty and unemployment, 
which cause this migration, are addressed, any restrictive American 
policy will only contribute further to Mexican social unrest and in-
stability. 
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For the United States, the presence of millions of Mexican laborers 
constitutes a ~ facto "guest worker" arrangement not unlike that of 
Britain, Germany, or France.21 Bluntly stated, the United States needs 
the Mexican to fill the unattractive, dirty, and low paying jobs which 
Americans (including most minority Americans) are reluctant to take. 
Since the illegal alien is usually willing to work for less than his 
American counterpart and is also difficult to unionize, American employ-
ers find Mexican labor attractive. In a very real sense, then, both 
nations need each other. 
A recent study prepared by the Library of Congress concluded that 
past experience demonstrated an adverse effect upon wages and working 
conditions of domestic workers by allowing aliens in. 22 Furthermore, 
the study noted that in spite of a shortage of unskilled labor in the 
United States, action on a large scale guest worker program for the 
United States should be postponed. 23 Notwithstanding the Library of 
Congress report, some sort of renewed Bracero program appears to be the 
only plausible solution to the immigration problem. Mexico's rapid 
population growth will continue for the foreseeable future. This also 
implies that pressure for northward migration will be a long-term phe-
nomenon rather than a short-term one. Mexico's massive unemployment 
problem lures millions of its jobless northward seeking work in the 
United States. Even though the plight of the Mexican worker in the 
United States is of ten very harsh, the United States nevertheless repre-
sents an improvement over the conditions which exist in Mexico. 
Therefore, the United States policy regarding illegal immigration 
is of primary importance to the continued stability of Mexico. It would 
seem that the immigration problem tends to be minor for the United States, 
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but vital for Mexico. Any attempt by the United States government to 
halt the flow of Mexicans across the border will cause serious reper-
cussions in Mexico. Generally, the most vocal opposition to the illegal 
alien is organized labor. Organized labor often claims that the illegal 
alien contributes to unemployment in the United States by securing em-
ployment which otherwise would be filled by United States workers. How-
ever, if economic conditions worsen in the United States in the 1980's, 
then one can expect pressures for more restrictive immigration policies 
to increase. 
In 1977, the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service 
reported that nearly 1 million surreptitous entries into the United 
States where detected and thwarted, with nearly all of these occurring 
on the United States-Mexican border. 24 However, for every unsuccessful 
attempted entry, it is believed that quite a few more are successful. 
Additionally, nearly 1 million illegal Mexicans residing in the United 
States were discovered and deported in 1977.25 
The mother of a Mexican who regularly journeys to California to 
work summed up the Mexican attitude about working illegally in the 
United States. When quizzed about the possibility of the entire family 
moving to California, she replied, "We would all go if we could ••• Who 
knows, maybe everyone in Mexico would go ••• All of us. There is nothing 
for us in Mexico. 11 26 
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CHAPTER V 
CONCLUSION 
This study advanced the hypothesis that Mexico is an example of a 
political system in the process of declining legitimacy. It was further 
argued that a crisis of regime maintenance is in process because of the 
inability of the system to successfully deal with a growing number of 
fundamental problems. Additionally, it is believed that there is a 
causal association between these two processes. That is, the decadence 
of political institutions in Mexico results from a loss of legitimacy of 
the political system. This loss of legitimacy stems from the declining 
ability of the system to satisfy mass demands. 
The weakening of Mexican political institutions is not intrinsic to 
the authoritarian one-party political structure; it is due to extrinsic 
factors. For example, political institutions in Mexico, specifically the 
PRI, lack sufficient autonomy or independence from the small wealthy 
elite. Consequently, the PRI cannot articulate and formulate public 
policies directed at the connnon interest because private interests domi-
nate public ones. The subordination of public goals to private ones 
allows a small privileged class to impede the adoption of policies di-
rected at promoting the public well-being. Mexican policy makers should 
consider the adoption of tax codes and other policies which would en-
courage labor-intensive production technologies rather than capital-
intensive ones. Mexican industrialists and financiers find it more 
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profitable to build factories on the North American model rather than 
apply more appropriate production forms~viz., labor-intensive indus-
tries~to existing conditions, and they possess the economic and poli-
tical power to impose such a policy. 
The problem is not that a very small number of individuals control 
the political decision making apparatus, because this is the case in 
most countries whether developed or developing. The problem basically 
results from an absence of foresight by those in power. Income inequal-
ity will exist in any capitalist economy, but the severity of income 
inequality in Mexico is destabilizing in that it leads to social and 
political unrest. 
Another factor which is fostering decadence of the Mexican system 
is the narrowness of scope of the political institutions. Structurally, 
the PRI is a broad based party organized around the major segments of 
Mexican society. In reality, the peasants and labor have little input 
into the system. While in theory the party is inclusive, in fact, the 
party tends to be quite exclusionary. Julius Nyerere has warned that 
"No party which limits its membership to a clique can ever free itself 
from f.ear of overthrow by those it has excluded. 11 1 The PRI derives 
legitimacy insofar as it promotes the goals of the Revolution. By enun-
ciating hollow revolutionary rhetoric, the legitimacy of the PRI as a 
political institution is transformed into alienation for the system. 
The strength of the Mexican system depends upon the strength of the PRI. 
Corruption also promotes. political decay. This is not to say that 
corruption is always dysfunctional. In many circumstances, political 
corruption can have a positive influence on economic development or the 
process of nation building. There is also a eultural bias which leads 
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to the identification of some practices as corrupt which. may be actually 
culturally acceptable to the particular society in question. That is, 
one must be careful that the political norms or behavioral standards 
used in defining corruption are applicable to the society under investi-
gation. Nepotism as a means to relieve unemployment or bribery to sup-
plement the low wages of bureaucrats may perform a useful function in 
the Mexican system. But corruption in Mexico is extensive, encompass-
ing all aspects of society. The persistence of corruption in Mexico 
must be considered a weakness of the regime since it presents an obstacle 
in securing support for political institutions and organizations. The 
widespread malfeasance of party officials and bureaucrats benefits the 
interests of a few at the expense of the majority of Mexicans. 
Any analysis of political instability must be tempered by several 
considerations. First, in Mexico (and Latin America generally), politi-
cal processes and institutions do not always function according to the 
legally prescribed norms. The Mexican Congress and Mexican labor unions 
do not perform the same function in the Mexican system as their American 
counterparts in the United States. Thus, these institutions and processes 
may give the appearance of being unstable or chaotic when, in reality, 
they are not. Secondly, all political systems are compelled to guide or 
manage pressures for change. While the forces of change often are de-
stabilizing, the successful adaptation to new situations or coping with 
problems is a sign of system strength. In view of these considerations: 
A stable political system may be defined as one wh.ich can 
manage change w:lthin its structures. In a stable system, 
the pattern of interactions is not subject to large or radi-
cal change, and the political actors can depend upon certain 
procedures and relationships, which adjust to the changing 
requirements of the society. Stability results, on the one 
hand, from the views that the population have of their politi-
cal system and, on the other hand, from the strength of the 
system itself. In a stable political system, the members of 
the system consider it to be both legitimate and effective 
and the system, in turn, must have the power and ability to 
meet the demands and needs of the society as well as the 
flexibility to adjust to changing circumstances. An un-
stable system is the converse of the stable system.2 
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By this definition, Me~ico past would qualify as a stable system. 
Change was managed through the existing structures either by cooptation 
or repression. Also, the system enjoyed legitimacy due to the popular 
support given to the system by most sectors of Mexican society. 
This study concludes that support for the Mexican regime is eroding. 
Various factors in the Mexican system are causing increased alienation 
and thus undermining the ability of the government to respond to the 
demands and needs of society. Certain reforms, if adopted, could pre-
vent a further deterioration. For example, the PRI might re-implement 
reforms such as advocated by Carlos Madraza. Madraza, a former PRI 
president, attempted to introduce meaningful competition into the candi-
date selection process through the establishment of intra-party primaries. 
Such a policy would revitalize the PRI by curbing the abuses of power 
by PRI officials and make them more responsive. Today, there are few 
internal or external checks placed on party members in positions of 
power. 
The one-party system seems to be best suited to Mexico's needs. 
Competition between parties in Mexico would prove to be counterproductive 
as it would increase the polarization of Mexican society when Mexico 
needs a dynamic and vital party to confront her social, economic, and 
political problems. 
As asserted earlier, the Mexican political system is experiencing 
a process of degeneration. Decay can be expected to continue because of 
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the severity of the destabilizing elements in Mexican society. Mexico's 
economic development policies have not solved, but in fact have worsened, 
the economic condition of a vast segment of the Mexican nation. The top 
five percent of the Mexican population received forty percent of the 
national income whereas the poorest twenty percent receives only four 
percent of the national income.3 Since the political power of the 
economic elite is extensive, changes to redress this inequality are not 
likely to be forthcoming. With the "rising expectations" of the Mexican 
frustrated, the result will be more alienation and disenchantment with 
the existing system. 
' Additionally, the rapid population growth places increased strain 
on already scarce resources. Schools cannot be built and teachers can-
not be trained fast enough to provide education for the increasing 
number of school aged children. The needs of Mexican society are ex-
panding faster than the ability of the system to satisfy those needs. 
As a result, the standard of living for most Mexicans will decline 
rather than improve. In other words, suffering will increase, not de-
crease. The mass exodus from Mexico to the United States validates 
this assessment. 
If the contention that the problems confronting contemporary Mexico 
are beyond the scope of the remedial power of the system is correct, 
this poses a serious threat to the continued maintenance of the system. 
Therefore, it is appropriate to speculate on some possible alternative 
directions of change. First, notwithstanding the increased alienation 
of the masses, which makes this segment of the population more suscep-
tible to political mobilization, a Castro-style revolution in Mexico 
appears doubtful. The organization of this sector into a force of poli-
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tical opposition would be extremely difficult in view of the power and 
resources of the upper and middle sectors. Secondly, the United States 
could not tolerate a hostile regime as it would threaten extensive Ameri-
can holdings in Mexico. Consequently, it would be in the national in-
terest of the United States to assist in the suppression of a movement 
of this type. 
A more plausible scenario would be one of increased oppression in 
Mexico. Faced with the inability of satisfying mass-demands, Mexico 
will find it increasingly necessary to repress dissent to keep the sys-
tem intact. This strategy might prove successful so long as the demands 
of the middle class can be placated. In other words, the alienation of 
the middle class is a much greater threat to the system than the alien-
ation of the working class and peasants. 
A third possibility is the intervention by the military. By Latin 
American standards, the political power of the Mexican military is gen-
erally considered to be weak. However, in times of economic or political 
crisis, the upper and middle classes might turn to the military as a 
means to maintain order. Or if the military perceives the civilian 
government as too feeble to maintain stability, the military might in-
tervene on its own initiative. The key to Mexico's future would seem to 
lie in the plight of the middle class and the role of Mexican military 
assumes within the system. 
The consequences of the decay of the Mexican system is impossible 
to forecast. In the absence of structured reforms, the present regime 
seems incapable of solving the problems currently besetting Mexico. 
This is likely to result in a crisis of regime maintenance for the pres-
ent system. The prospects for Mexico are not bright. Therefore, it 
will be instructive for others to observe the manner in which Mexico 
chooses to ignore or solve her problems of poverty, unemployment, in-
come inequality, and population growth. Various scholars have noted 
the capacity of the Mexican to endure hardship and suffering. But 
Kenneth Johnson surmises that: 
The Mexican political system is a throne atop a pyramid 
which has lost most of its basic popular support. With-
drawal of consent is one basic weapon of the poor. In-
surgency is another. Power without legitimacy, that is 
contemporary Mexico. Poverty and repression have thres-
holds of criticality. When the peogle can endure no more, 
political collapse can be expected. 
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APPENDIX 
MEXICAN PRESIDENTS, 1876-1982 
I 
Porfirio Diaz 1876-1911 
Francisco I. Madero 1911-1913 
Victoriano Huerta 1913-1914 
Venustiano Carranza 1914-1920 
I 
Alvaro Obregon 1920-1924 
/ 
Plutarco Elias Calles 1924-1928 
Emilio Portes Gil 1928-1929 
Pascual Ortiz Rubio 1929-1932 
/ 
Abelardo Rodriquez 1932-1934 
/ / 
Lazaro Cardenas 1934-1940 
/ 
Manuel Avila Camacho 1940-1946 
/ 
Miquel Aleman 1946-1952 
Adolfo Ruiz Cortines 1952-1958 
/ 
Adolfo Lopez Mateos 1958-1964 
/ 
Gustavo Diaz Ordaz 1964-1970 
/ 
Luis Echeverria Alvarez 1970-1976 
,, / 
Jose Lopez Portillo 1976-1982 
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